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In recent years the Com-munist Party of China (CPC) has shown an in-
creasing concern for basing 
its legitimacy on the support 
of the people as well as the 
need to continue to deserve 
the people’s support. On 1 
September 2010, in a speech 
to the Party School of the 
Central Committee, Xi Jin-
ping (who would go on to 
become General Secretary of 
the CPC in 2012, and Presi-
dent of the PRC thereafter) 
called on Party members to 
have a “correct view of the 
world, of power and of their 
work” and defined “citizen 
empowerment” (公民赋权 
gōngmín fù quán), by saying, 
“the Marxist view of power 
can be summed up in two 
phrases: power is given by 
the people, and power is 
used for the people [权为民
所赋, 权为民所用 quán wéi 
mín suǒ fù, quán wéi mín suǒ 
yòng].” To Euroamerican ears this recalls (but not entirely) 
Abraham Lincoln’s definition from the Gettysburg Address: 
“Government of the people, by the people, for the people”. 
On 4 September 2014 in a 
meeting with foreign ex-
perts that I attended in Bei-
jing as part of The Party and 
the World Dialogue 2014 dedi-
cated to China’s New Reforms: 
the Role of the Party, the Vice-
President of China, Li Yuan-
chao, stated quite clearly 
that the CPC runs the risk of 
losing power were it to lose 
the support of the people 
and that there is no guaran-
tee of the people’s support: 
the Party must earn it.
The previous administra-
tion had already raised the 
risk of the Party losing the 
support of the people unless 
it performed well. On 5 De-
cember 2002, then General 
Secretary and President Hu 
Jintao said, “Leading cadres 
at all levels must continue to 
work at the grassroots level, 
going among the masses, 
listening to the call of the 
masses, tending to the hardships of the masses, exercis-
ing power for the people, empathizing with the feelings of 
the people, and working for the well-being of the people.” 
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The Party’s preoccupation with maintaining its “ruling status” dem-
onstrates a concern with legitimacy and with the mechanisms that 
are needed to gain and maintain legitimacy.
The CPC runs the risk of losing power were it to lose the support of 
the people and that there is no guarantee of the people’s support: the 
Party must earn it.
Only if the Party is in power can it work to improve the people’s 
standard of living; only if it improves the people’s standard of living 
can it hope to remain in power. Which comes first?
The current fight against corruption is an example of the Party’s con-
cern for the people’s perception of Party governance. 
Thinkers like Sun Yat-sen tried to explain Euroamerican concepts 
to a Chinese society that did not share the Euroamerican tradition. 
Now it has become necessary to explain the new Chinese concepts 
of political reform to Euroamerican societies that do not share the 
Chinese tradition. In one tradition people are accustomed to being 
selected; in the other, to being elected.
The Party-State’s ability to manage modernisation, to maintain in-
stitutional stability, to sustain the rate of economic growth (efficien-
cy), and to equitably distribute wealth (equity) are the factors that 
give it political legitimacy. Therefore, there are three key elements 
for the country’s future: stability, efficiency and equity.
There is no separation between the CPC and the State Administra-
tion, a situation that rules out alternation in power, but the possibil-
ity of a loss of legitimacy because of mismanagement could precipi-
tate social movements that might alter the political. 
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The Hong Kong media1 summed this up as the “new three 
principles of the people” (新三民主  xīn sānmínzhǔyì), al-
luding to the early 20th century political philosophy of Sun 
Yat-sen, and these principles were later written into official 
Party documents.
Sun Yat-sen’s original “three principles of the people” (三
民主  sānmínzhǔyì), so-called because each begins with 
the term “people” (民 mín), were: “nationalism” (民族主义 
mínzúzhǔyì) where 民族 mínzú refers to the people’s com-
mon ethnicity, “democracy” or “people power” (民权主义 
mínquánzhǔyì) where the term 权 quán refers to “power” or 
to the people holding the balance of power, and “welfare” 
or “livelihood” of the people (民生主义 mínshēngzhǔyì), or 
“socialism” in the eyes of the PRC. Xi Jinping’s use of the 
phrase “power is given by the people” ( 民所  quán wéi 
mín suǒ fù) builds on Hu Jintao’s three new principles by 
defining the origin of power. 
On various occasions Hu Jintao warned that the CPC’s “rul-
ing status” (执政地位 zhízheng dìwèi) is not guaranteed. A 
2004 Party document entitled Decision on the Strengthening of 
the Chinese Communist Party’s Ruling Ability states that “the 
Party’s ruling status is not a birthright, nor is it permanent”. 
In 2008 the People’s Daily quoted Hu Jintao as saying: “The 
Party’s core ruling status is not permanent, possession in 
the past does not equate to possession in the present, and 
possession in the present does not equate to possession in 
the future.” In 2011 Hu reiterated, “leading cadres at vari-
ous levels must bear in mind that the power in our hands 
was vested by the people.” 
In 2010, former Prime Minister Wen Jiabao made “seven 
references to political reform” (七谈政改风波 qī tán zhèng 
gǎibiǎn fēngbō), telling a CNN interviewer that “the people’s 
wishes for, and needs for, democracy and freedom are ir-
resistible.” He stressed the need to protect civil rights (保障
权利 bǎozhàng quánlì) and to restrict government power (制
约权力 zhìyuē quánlì). 
Wen Jiabao’s calls for political reform during the previous 
administration were contested in March 2011 by Wu Bang-
guo, then chairman of the National People’s Congress and 
member of the Politburo Standing Committee, who pro-
claimed the “Five Will Nots” (五不告 wǔbùgào): China will 
not do rotational multiparty rule, will not do diversity of 
guiding ideologies, will not do “separation of powers”, will 
not do a bicameral system, and will not do privatisation of 
property. This thorough rejection of the liberal parliamen-
tary model developed in the “West” has its origins in Deng 
1. China Media Project. The University of Hong Kong. [Date accessed 15.12.2014]
http://cmp.hku.hk/
Xiaoping’s 1987 rejection of “the separation of three pow-
ers” (三权分立 sānquán fēnlì), the division of political power 
into the executive, legislative and judiciary branches of gov-
ernment.
Now that Xi Jinping is in charge of administering power 
and has reiterated the people as the source of power and 
the responsibility of the Party vis-à-vis the people, the cur-
rent administration is trying to build on the principles of 
political reform defended by Hu jintao and Wen Jiabao in 
a gradual fashion. The latest Plenum of the CPC in Octo-
ber 2014 was dedicated to implementing 法治 fǎzhì, a com-
pound term that combines 法 fǎ “law” and 治 zhì “govern-
ance”, meaning that the laws should be used to govern, that 
governance should not be arbitrary.
The Party’s preoccupation with maintaining its “ruling sta-
tus” demonstrates a concern with legitimacy and with the 
mechanisms that are needed to gain and maintain legitima-
cy. It also represents a dilemma. Only if the Party is in power 
can it work to improve the people’s standard of living; only 
if it improves the people’s standard of living can it hope to 
remain in power. Which comes first? A recent Pew Research 
Center’s Global Attitudes Survey2 indicate that the Chinese 
people’s level of satisfaction with their government is much 
higher than that of most other peoples around the world 
with other government systems, a factor of legitimacy that 
is often emphasised by spokespersons for the CPC govern-
ment system. 
The current fight against 
corruption is an example of 
the Party’s concern for the 
people’s perception of Party 
governance. At the same 
time the CPC is emphasis-
ing closer attention to the people’s needs. This involves two 
processes. The first step is “consulting the grass roots” (基层
民主协商 jīcéng mínzhǔ xiéshāng). CPC officials try to survey 
the grass-roots in order to determine the difficulties, prob-
lems and concerns for which the people want solutions. The 
second step is to commission “experts and scholars” (专家
学者 zhuānjiā xuézhě) from think tanks and research centres 
to propose solutions to the concerns raised in the first step. 
The Party then has the role of arbitrating competing needs 
and proposals for the common good. If the CPC succeeds 
in satisfying the people’s needs it will have gained the peo-
ple’s support, and legitimacy. If it fails to do so, it will lose 
their support and its own legitimacy.
The great turnaround in the socialist revolution in China 
engineered by Deng Xiaoping and maintained by successive 
administrations has been based since 1978 on the policy of 
“reform and opening up” (改革开放 gǎigékāifàng), reforming 
the economy by the introduction of market forces and open-
ing up the economy by abandoning autarchy in favour of 
Foreign Direct Investment. In the late 1980’s, Deng Xiaoping 
2. Pew Research Center. Global Attitudes Survey. [Date accessed 15.12.2014]
http://www.businessinsider.com/pew-research-global-satisfaction-map-2014-2
The debate on political reform that is taking place inside 
the CCP is important and needs to be better understood 
outside of China.
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pointed out that it is impossible to redistribute wealth that 
does not exist and promoted the creation of wealth as a pre-
condition to building a future socialist society, even if this 
meant that some would become wealthy sooner than others. 
The period from the founding of the PRC in 1949 until the 
death of Mao Zedong in 1976 accumulated capital through 
the promotion of heavy industry, laying the foundation for 
a second revolution based on light industry and consumer 
consumption. 
The Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party 
since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, the official 
CPC verdict on Mao’s contribution to the modernisation of 
China published in 1981 stated that his policies had been 
right 70% of the time but wrong 30% of the time. Xi Jinping 
has given a new orientation to the evaluation of the history 
of the revolution by dividing it into two thirty year periods 
and saying that the first thirty years (the Maoist years) can-
not be judged on the basis of the second thirty years (the 
Dengist years), nor can the second thirty years be judged 
on the basis of the first thirty years, thus neatly defending 
both the Maoist and the Dengist versions of the primitive 
accumulation of capital and fending off both the old guard 
of hard-line conservatives in the Party and the upcoming 
generations that demand an acceleration of the liberalisa-
tion of the economy. 
A corollary to Xi’s new periodisation of the history of the 
PRC is that another thirty year period has now begun. The 
first thirty years of radical 
Maoist egalitarianism and 
voluntarism guaranteed 
everyone a minimum qual-
ity of life but at the cost of 
a minimum standard of liv-
ing. The second thirty years 
of Deng’s socialist market economy notably improved eve-
ryone’s standard of living but at the cost of growing ine-
qualities among regions and sectors of the population. The 
next thirty years begin with a fundamental and qualitative 
change in the nature of China’s modernisation. As economic 
growth increases, not everyone benefits to the same extent. 
As a result the number of vested interests of “the haves” 
increases but so does the level of discontent of “the have 
nots”, and the government system can no longer count on 
the same degree of popular support unless it manages to 
arbitrate well the conflicting demands of the vested inter-
ests of the elites and the common good, of wealth and the 
commonwealth. 
This makes the maintenance of stability a fundamental ne-
cessity, a factor that explains the CPC’s concern with main-
taining social control and its insistence that only the Party-
State system can correctly arbitrate the next phase of the 
revolution. The PRC’s only experience of direct participa-
tory democracy was the Cultural Revolution, a negative ex-
ample because the creation of “bottom-up” assemblies and 
the unhindered actions of “Red Guards” lead to lawlessness 
and disorder. The CPC insists that individual political par-
ties in a multi-party electoral system each represent only 
part of the population, only represent some of the vested 
interests, but that no party in a multi-party electoral system 
can represent all of the population, all of the interests. This 
is the role the CPC envisages for itself. It is the power struc-
ture that would allow the CPC to construct the “Chinese 
dream” (中国梦 Zhōngguó mèng) during the coming period.
Political reform with Chinese characteristics (中国特色 
Zhōngguó tèsè) has been part of the debate about modernity 
in China since the 19th century. Sun Yat-sen was just one of 
many Chinese thinkers who saw a need to adapt Euroamer-
ican ideas of political order to the specific circumstances of 
China by distinguishing the power of politics or the sover-
eignty of the people (政权 zhèngquán) from governance (治
权 zhìquán). 
The people were meant to authorise the government by 
means of four mechanisms: universal suffrage to elect of-
ficials (选举 xuǎnjǔ), the power of recall of elected officials 
(罢免 bàmiǎn), the capacity to initiate legislation by means 
of petitions (创制 chuàngzhì), and recourse to referenda in 
order to ratify legislation (复决 fùjué). But for Sun Yat-sen 
the sovereignty of the people was one thing and governance 
was something else, something to be carried out by experts, 
by technocrats, who would have to consult the people and 
answer to the people in order to ratify their support. 
He proposed the introduction of the Euroamerican separa-
tion of powers into three branches of government –legisla-
tive (立法 lìfǎ), executive (行政 xíngzhèng) and judiciary (司
法 sīfǎ)- but he also saw the need to include two additional 
branches that had their origins in the Chinese meritocratic 
political tradition -a meritocratic civil service (考试 kǎoshì) 
and an ombudsman-like supervision of government (监察 
jiānchá). He saw his proposals as an improvement on the 
systems established in the West, and thought them better 
suited to Chinese purposes.
The current debate on political reform in China should be 
studied in a similar context of adapting basic principles of 
government on behalf of the people in ways that respect 
the sovereignty of the people. But the situation has been re-
versed. Thinkers like Sun Yat-sen were trying to explain Eu-
roamerican concepts to a Chinese society that did not share 
the Euroamerican tradition. Now it has become necessary 
to explain the new Chinese concepts of political reform to 
Euroamerican societies that do not share the Chinese tradi-
tion. Because both the concepts and the terminology being 
used in Chinese are unfamiliar in the West, and because the 
established concepts and terminology of Euroamerican po-
litical theory have pre-existing connotations in the West that 
are not isomorphic with Chinese theory, we need to estab-
lish cross-cultural paradigms and methodologies in order 
to explain to each other the bases and the consequences of 
our differing theories. Otherwise there will be cultural bar-
riers that prevent Euroamericans from understanding the 
differing connotations of 人/仁 rén (altruism; contextualised 
Political reform with Chinese characteristics has been part 
of the debate about modernity in China since the 19th 
century.
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litical reform with Chinese characteristics must keep these 
differences in mind.
The reformist and revolutionary thinkers who wanted to 
import Western democracy to modernise China came to 
doubt the efficacy of passing too rapidly from an autocratic 
monarchy to a populist free-for-all (as they saw things). 
Democracy in the West was the product of centuries of po-
litical, economic and social evolution. China needed time to 
prepare itself for democracy. Sun Yat-sen did not think the 
adoption of the executive, legislative and judicial branches 
would work without a meritocratic bureaucracy and a body 
to oversee those who governed. He thought the technocrats 
should govern and periodically seek confirmation of the 
support of the people, not that the people should govern di-
rectly, nor directly choose those who would govern them.
The Chinese defense of meritocracy as an alternative to 
democracy should be examined on its own merits and not 
simply dismissed out of hand. Chinese political scientists 
distinguish between “elective democracy” and “consulta-
tive democracy”. They distrust the former because it does 
not guarantee that those who are elected would actually be 
competent to govern, either 
ethically or in terms of com-
petence. On the other hand, 
they do say that power 
comes from the people and 
the technocrats must admin-
ister power on their behalf, 
so the people must be consulted. This leads to a principle 
of pre-selection in the electoral processes that do exist in 
China at the local level and within the CPC. 
It would be easy to say that such a process will only allow 
for candidates who are favourable to the selectors’ policies, 
but there is a long historical and philosophical tradition be-
hind this line of thinking. It is also easy to say that electors in 
the West are allowed to vote for the candidate of their choice 
when in practice they also have little choice over which can-
didates the competing political parties will allow to stand for 
election, candidates chosen on the basis of compatibility with 
party policy. In general they can only vote for the candidates 
who are presented to them by the political parties, not neces-
sarily for the candidates they would like to see put forward. 
This kind of party politics in the West has led to a crisis in 
the system, crippling any possibility of a broad consensus 
through radical ideological bipolarisation, permitting the 
growth of inequality by catering to vested interests (includ-
ing the vested interests of the political parties’ own internal 
bureaucracies) and provoking the phenomenon of broadly 
based social protest movements such as the Movimento Cinque 
Stelle in Italy or Podemos in Spain, because growing segments 
of the population do not trust the competence (or moral fibre) 
of party candidates to solve their problems.
Thus the debate on political reform that is taking place in-
side the CCP is extremely important and needs to be bet-
ter understood outside of China. Distinguishing “formal” 
democracy (形式民主 xíngshì mínzhǔ or 民主机制 mínzhǔ 
jīzhì or 正式民主 zhèngshì mínzhǔ) from “substantive” de-
mocracy (实质民主 shízhì mínzhǔ) is one difficulty. Formal 
relationships; social roles) and “individual/person”, for in-
stance, which lead to an emphasis on social roles and mu-
tual obligations in the case of 人/仁 rén but to essentialist 
concept of rights in the case of “individual”. 
Another major area of differing perceptions concerns the 
emphasis on meritocracy in the Chinese tradition versus the 
emphasis on suffrage and openly elected representatives in 
the Euroamerican democratic tradition. In one tradition 
people are accustomed to being selected; in the other, to be-
ing elected. 
This concept is also closely associated with the concept of 
legitimacy, and the demonstration of legitimacy. In the case 
of China, the Party-State’s ability to manage modernisa-
tion, to maintain institutional stability, to sustain the rate 
of economic growth (efficiency), and to equitably distribute 
wealth (equity) are the factors that give it political legitima-
cy. Therefore, there are three key elements for the country’s 
future: stability, efficiency and equity. There is no separa-
tion between the CPC and the State Administration, a situ-
ation that rules out alternation in power, but the possibility 
of a loss of legitimacy because of mismanagement could 
precipitate social movements that might alter the political 
status quo. The political management of these risks requires 
the maintenance of sustained but also sustainable economic 
growth, and an equitable redistribution of wealth, accom-
panied by political reform that would not destabilise the 
country.
Meritocracy is deeply rooted in Chinese political and so-
cial thought. For Confucius and his followers, the Sovereign 
had to merit his position on the basis of moral quality. Not 
everyone deserved to rule. For the Legalists, who created 
the State administration in the 4th century BC, those who 
governed had to be experts in governance. In his textbook 
study The Origins of Political Order, Francis Fukuyama3 cred-
its China with the creation of the State as a means of com-
bating what Max Weber defined as patrimonialism –todays 
“vested interests” of “the elites”- and with the creation of a 
centralised bureaucracy based on meritocracy to administer 
the State in favour of that which is public (公 gōng) instead 
of that which is private (私 sī) in order to guarantee the com-
mon good. As a result political order in China would be 
based on altruism and contextualised relationships or social 
roles (仁 rén) organised by hierarchical (孝 xiào) but shifting 
fiduciary relationships. Thus, in comparison with modern 
Europe, there was in political terms a “China model” (中国模
式 Zhōngguó móshì) with “Chinese characteristics” (中国特色 
Zhōngguó tèsè) from the outset. Any comparative study of po-
3. FUKUYAMA, Francis. The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French 
Revolution. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2011.
The Chinese defense of meritocracy as an alternative to 
democracy should be examined on its own merits and not 
simply dismissed out of hand.
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democracy in Mexico did not prevent the same political 
party from holding power for 73 years, nor has it guaran-
teed stability in Iraq or Afghanistan, but what is substantive 
democracy and how does it evolve? For some, this distinc-
tion is an attempt to avoid the introduction of elections; 
for others, it is a serious debate in political philosophy. In 
any case, it must be taken into consideration in the frame-
work of a serious dialogue on political reform. In the case 
of intra-Party democracy what are the distinctions between 
and justifications of such current terms in Chinese politi-
cal science as “deliberative democracy” (协商民主 xiéshāng 
mínzhǔ) –seen as being correct- as opposed to “elective de-
mocracy” (选举民主 xuǎnjǔ mínzhǔ) –seen as being incor-
rect; or between “differential (multi-candidate) election” (
差额选举 chā’é xuǎnjǔ) and “mutual nomination” (公推直选 
gōngtuī zhíxuǎn)? What is the emerging role of “informal” 
or “non-governmental” or “civil” society (民间社会 mínjiān 
shèhuì) and what will it become? Is the CPC a political party 
or an entire political system? Can it be compared to political 
parties in Western liberal democracies? Is this a useful com-
parison? If power comes from the people, and is exercised 
on behalf of the people, how can the CPC demonstrate that 
it is accountable to the people? How can the people show 
they do –or do not- support 
the CPC? How would the 
CPC respond to a loss of 
support? If Chinese people 
have been accustomed for 
thousands of years to being 
selected rather than to being 
elected, under what circumstances should direct election be 
a valid and efficient process of selection?
The 21st century construction of a new Chinese discourse 
on political theory and political reform faces the same di-
lemma that Chinese intellectuals first identified in the 19th 
century, of making Eurocentric sociocultural, economic 
and political theory and praxis compatible with Sinocentric 
sociocultural, economic and political circumstances. At the 
same time, among Chinese thinkers and strategists, there 
is a growing self-confidence in the Chinese ability to lead 
a new post-Western world order. Euroamerican faith in the 
convergence of all societies into a single economic, social 
and political model that is part of the heritage of the En-
lightenment is challenged by the emergence of new eco-
nomic powers outside the Euroamerican sphere that resist 
this model. As a result of the absolutism, universalism and 
essentialism that characterise thought in the West, many 
Euroamerican analysts conclude that China will seek to im-
pose its alternative model as a new unique and universal 
model, a conclusion that is symptomatic of a tendency to 
attribute the motives of one’s own behaviour to another, 
but the divergence between the “Beijing Consensus” and 
the “Washington consensus” is not necessarily an example 
of dichotomy or antinomy. As opposed to mutually exclu-
sive antinomies and dichotomies in Western thought, 阴
阳 yīnyáng, the ideal of maintaining plurality and diver-
sity in a harmonious relationship as an alternative to one 
track thinking and exclusive orthodoxy, is a fundamental 
component of the Chinese tradition, not the Euroamerican 
tradition. Marxism, whether Maoist or Dengist in tenden-
cy, has its origins in an absolutist and essentialist tradition 
of Western thinking. “Chinese characteristics” are part of 
an on-going historical process of trying to adapt it (and its 
competitor: “Adam Smithism”) to Chinese circumstances. 
In the past it was the Chinese State that had to provide the 
adequate conditions for harmony and plurality, without 
allowing competing factions of patrimonialist elites to get 
the upper hand. Today the CPC sees itself as the Chinese 
State, playing the same role as the traditional State.
The fact that Chinese strategists often link their new po-
litical theories to the ideas of ancient Chinese strategists 
demonstrates the continuity of a long-term perception of 
political strategy with Chinese characteristics. Unlike the 
standard Euroamerican theory of “rational choice”, based 
on cost-benefit analysis or instrumental rationalism, Chi-
nese culture has traditionally preferred make order (正 
zhèng) and harmony (和 hé) compatible as alternatives to 
disorder (乱 luàn), has preferred cooperation (合作 hézuò) 
to competition (竞争 jìngzhēng), as well as mutual benefit (
互利 hùlì) and “win-win” diplomacy (共  gòngyíng) in the 
development of various political strategies that suit China’s 
own culture and circumstances and in order to avoid the 
worst and achieve the best of any political order. 
Of course there is a danger of exceptionalism in a more rela-
tivistic approach to political theory or in a purely Sinocen-
tric approach, but the West is not exempt from an accusation 
of reverse exceptionalism when it insists that its theories are 
the only acceptable theories, that is to say, when the West at-
tributes the characteristic of universal to its own historically 
and culturally contingent theories. 
In his study of the ancient origins of political authority in 
China, the renowned Chinese archaeologist Chang Kwang-
Chih4 (Zhang Guangzhi) addressed this issue.
“Theories of history have typically been built on the history 
of Western civilization. In the modem world, Western civili-
zation has undergone the most remarkable expansion in the 
annals of mankind, quickly enveloping the globe, and it has 
brought with it theories formulated on the basis of its own 
formidable and massive history to explain the origin and 
history of all human society. Since these theories occasion-
ally guided social and political activists in their endeavours 
to change the world, they are of more than academic inter-
est. … It is time to consider the possibility that theories of 
history could be built on the development of other civiliza-
tions and that such theories could offer new insights, not 
only relating to abstract principles about the past but also to 
political action in the future. (…) When China and the West 
encountered each other in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
4. CHANG, Kwang-Chih. Art, Myth, and Ritual: The Path to Political Authority in Ancient 
China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983.
A geopolitical power shift has occurred, but the 
paradigms that dominate Euroamerican political theory 
have not shifted. 
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centuries, there was initially a one-way flow of sociological 
theory from West to East. (…) The issue of the rise of political 
authority is one that pertains to every ancient civilization. But 
it is only now, when new data have become available, that we 
can seriously begin to explore the question in the light of Chi-
nese facts. The process that emerges from such an exploration 
might be identical with those that have been hypothesized by 
Western theorists, on the basis of the history of Western civili-
zation; but it might also be significantly different.”
Curricula and theoretical frameworks for political science 
courses in the Euroamerican context are dominated by a 
limited number of paradigms that tend to become “para-
dogmas” that reflect an unquestioned or unproblematised 
Eurocentric or Euroamericacentric bias. They lack intellec-
tual and theoretical diversity. A geopolitical power shift has 
occurred, but the paradigms that dominate Euroamerican 
political theory have not shifted. Does the West run the risk 
of falling prey to the Maginot Line Syndrome, preparing ob-
solete defences of political systems and paradigms based on 
Westphalian nation-states for a post Bretton Woods world 
order that has moved the Rest into uncharted territory?
We need to establish cross-cultural 
paradigms and methodologies in 
order to explain to each other the 
bases and the consequences of our 
differing theories.
